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There have been dramatic events in world affairs that have changed the course of 
international history. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 provide only the most 
recent example. During the twentieth century, the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 at Sarajevo and Japan's attack on the US naval base at Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii on 7 December 1941, obviously fall into the same category. After more 
than two decades of reexamination, historians who specialize in Cold War studies now 
would add the Korean War. Reacting to North Korea's invasion of South Korea after 25 
June 1950, the United States not only greatly expanded its commitment to halt further 
Communist seizures of power elsewhere in East Asia, it also vastly increased defense 
spending, strengthened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization militarily, and pressed for 
West German rearmament. It was the Korean War that erroneously persuaded US leaders 
that only the direct application of military power could contain what they now perceived 
as a dire Soviet threat menacing the entire world. Shortly after an armistice ended the 
Korean conflict in July 1953, the United States would begin its intervention in Indochina, 
leading to a disastrous war in Vietnam.1
For many years, however, the Korean War attracted little attention from either diplomatic 
historians or the general public. Clay Blair even titled his detailed account of the Korean 
conflict, The Forgotten War. Other authors have labeled Korea The War Before Vietnam 
and The Unknown War.2 But since 1981, a swelling stream of books and articles 
reexamining not only the war itself, but US policy toward Korea before June 1950 has 
demonstrated the central importance of the conflict in altering the direction of postwar 
international affairs.3 In June 2000, The Society for Historians of American Foreign 
Relations acknowledged the elevated significance of the Korean War when it sponsored a 
"Symposium on the Korean War" in conjunction with its annual conference at Ryerson 
University in Toronto, Canada. This issue of the Journal of Conflict Studies presents 
revised versions of the papers that six scholars presented at that gathering to 
commemorate the 50 year anniversary of the Korean War.4 These articles rely on recent 
research to advance new interpretations on selected issues related to one of the most 
important events in modern world history. Although the Vietnam War still occupies a 
more prominent place in popular memory, the swiftly forgotten "police action" fought in 
Korea finally has escaped the obscure place that it occupied in Cold War literature for 
nearly a half century. 
This introduction will provide readers with an overview of the Korean War, attempting in 
the process to expose old myths and replace them with current realities about the conflict. 
Early accounts of the war almost without exception focused on events beginning with 
North Korea's invasion of South Korea. This was so because few people doubted that the 
Soviet Union had ordered the attack as part of its plan for global conquest. President 
Harry S. Truman provided support for this assumption just two days after the start of 
hostilities. On 27 June 1950, he told the American people that North Korea's attack on 
South Korea showed that world "communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to 
conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war."5 This 
assessment reflected Truman's firm belief that North Korea was a puppet of the Soviet 
Union and Kim Il Sung was acting on instructions from Moscow. In his memoirs, 
Truman equated Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin's actions with Adolf Hitler's in the 1930s, 
arguing that military intervention to defend the Republic of Korea (ROK) was vital 
because appeasement had not prevented but ensured the outbreak of World War II.6 
Senior administration officials, as well as the general public, fully shared these 
assumptions. This traditional interpretation provided the analytical foundation for early 
accounts of the war, perpetuating the most important myth of the Korean conflict.7
A consensus now prevails that the origins of the Korean War date from at least World 
War II. Rather than characterizing the conflict as the product of external aggression, 
scholars acknowledge the centrality of domestic factors. In fact, more than a decade ago, 
it became fashionable to portray the Korean War as a civil conflict, rejecting not only the 
assertion that it was an example of Soviet-inspired, external aggression, but denying 
Moscow's involvement. Bruce Cumings, the leading proponent of this interpretation, 
insisted in his two volume study titled The Origins of the Korean War, that a 
conventional war would start in Korea in June 1950 because the United States prevented 
a leftist revolution on the peninsula during 1945 and imposed a reactionary regime in the 
south during the years immediately following World War II.8 Accounts of the war 
thereafter adopted the Cumings interpretation. Callum MacDonald wrote that the North 
Korean "attack was the latest act in a civil war which had been taking shape since the 
liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945." Burton I. Kaufman labeled the conflict "a true 
civil war." For Peter Lowe, by 1950, the "situation in the Korean peninsula was in 
essence one of civil war." John Merrill charged that prior accounts of the Korean War 
ignored the "local setting," insisting that "the war can be usefully interpreted as a case of 
intervention in the ongoing civil strife in the South."9
Release of previously classified Soviet and Chinese documents during the 1990s abruptly 
ended the emerging consensus that Korea was a classic civil war. In the first essay that 
follows, William Stueck assesses "Revisionism and the Korean War" in light of this new 
information. In 1995, publication of his The Korean War: An International History 
reflected the renewed emphasis on international factors in reexaminations of the Korean 
conflict, contributing to the current description of it as an "international civil war" that 
only sounds like an oxymoron. Providing a succinct summary of this new consensus, 
Kathryn Weathersby asserts that the war's origins "lie primarily with the division of 
Korea in 1945 and the polarization of Korean politics that resulted from ... the policies of 
the two occupying powers .... The Soviet Union played a key role in the outbreak of the 
war, but it was as facilitator, not as originator."10 Many writers already had arrived at this 
conclusion before Communist archival materials became available in the course of 
reexamining US policy toward Korea before June 1950, focusing attention on how Korea 
came to be divided in 1945. A myth had taken hold in the McCarthy era that just as 
Communists in the State Department had helped Mao Zedong seize power in China, so 
too had they conspired to ensure Soviet control in North Korea. Korea's partition at the 
38th parallel allegedly was part of the price President Franklin D. Roosevelt paid at Yalta 
for Soviet entry in the Pacific war. This coexisted with another erroneous belief that the 
Allies divided Korea at the Potsdam Conference.11
We now know that President Truman proposed partitioning Korea on the eve of Japan's 
surrender to prevent the Soviets from occupying the entire peninsula. When he became 
president following Roosevelt's death in April 1945, Soviet expansion into Eastern 
Europe had begun to alarm US leaders. Almost from the outset, the new president 
expected Soviet actions in Korea to parallel Stalin's policies in Poland. Within a week 
after assuming office, Truman began to search for some way to eliminate any opportunity 
for a repetition of Soviet expansion. The atomic bomb seemed to provide him with an 
easy answer. Japan's prompt surrender after an atomic attack would preempt Soviet 
entrance into the Pacific war, thereby permitting the United States to occupy Korea alone 
and removing any possibility for "sovietization." But Truman's gamble failed. When 
Moscow declared war on Japan and sent the Red Army into Korea prematurely on 12 
August 1945, the United States proposed Korea's division into Soviet and American 
zones of military occupation at the 38th parallel. Only Stalin's acceptance of this 
desperate eleventh hour plan saved the peninsula from unification under Communist rule. 
Accepting Korea's division into suitable spheres of influence, the Soviet leader probably 
also hoped to trade this concession for an equal voice in occupied Japan.12
Korea soon found itself a captive of the Cold War. As Soviet-American relations in 
Europe deteriorated, neither side was willing to acquiesce to an agreement appreciably 
strengthening its adversary. After 18 months of failed negotiations, Washington and 
Moscow moved toward the formation of separate regimes, resulting in creation in August 
1948 of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south and the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (DPRK) in the north the following September.13 After North Korea launched its 
attack two years later, a myth took hold that the United States abandoned the ROK, 
thereby encouraging an invasion. Admittedly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had 
recommended during September 1947 prompt US military withdrawal from Korea, but a 
major uprising against the government of Syngman Rhee in October 1948 caused the 
United States to postpone disengagement until 29 June 1949. By then, Truman believed 
that South Korea could survive and even prosper without protection from US troops 
despite the existence of a powerful army in North Korea. This was because before US 
troops left, the administration had assumed a commitment to train, equip, and supply a 
security force in the south that was capable of preserving internal order and deterring an 
attack from the north. Also, it had asked Congress to approve a three-year program of 
technical and economic assistance.14
To build support for the Korean aid package, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson 
delivered a speech before the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, offering an 
optimistic appraisal of the ROK's future. In the second essay that follows, my "Dean 
Acheson's Press Club Speech Reexamined" uses Soviet documents to expose as myth the 
commonly accepted idea that Acheson's exclusion of South Korea from the US 
"defensive perimeter" gave the Kremlin a "green light" to order an attack. More 
important was the fact that the speech reflected the correct assumption guiding Truman's 
Korea policy that Moscow was reluctant to allow North Korea to practice open 
aggression. This belief allowed the administration to pursue qualified containment in 
Korea through economic means and the policy seemed to be experiencing marked 
success during the weeks after Acheson's address. South Korea had acted vigorously to 
end spiraling inflation, while elections late in May had given Rhee's critics control of the 
legislature. Finally, the South Korean army had nearly eliminated guerrilla activities 
threatening internal order, prompting the United States to approve a second year of 
economic aid and a large increase in military assistance.15
While the United States was willing to be patient, awaiting the collapse of what it saw as 
Moscow's artificial client state in North Korea, South Korea's President Rhee was 
obsessed with accomplishing early reunification through military means. The Truman 
administration's fear that Rhee would launch an invasion prompted it to limit South 
Korea's military capabilities, refusing to provide tanks, heavy artillery, and combat 
planes.16 This did not stop the South Koreans from initiating most of the border clashes 
with North Korean forces at the 38th parallel beginning in summer 1948 and reaching a 
high level of intensity and violence a year later. Historians now acknowledge that the two 
Koreas already were waging a civil conflict when North Korea's attack opened the 
conventional phase of the war.17 Contradicting traditional assumptions, however, Soviet 
documents demonstrate that throughout 1949 Stalin consistently refused to approve Kim 
Il Sung's persistent requests to approve an invasion of South Korea. It was not until April 
1950 that Stalin finally relented, after Kim persuaded him that a military victory would 
be quick and easy. Given the superior economic and military resources of the United 
States, Kim Il Sung knew that time was running out and manipulated both Stalin and Mao 
into supporting his desperate bid for reunification before Rhee could beat him to the 
punch.18
Few Americans then and thereafter doubted for a moment that on 25 June 1950, North 
Korea attacked South Korea on Stalin's orders. They also came to believe a myth that 
Truman acted with swiftness and courage to prevent conquest of the entire peninsula. But 
in fact, he did not commit US ground troops in Korea for almost a week, referring the 
matter instead to the United Nations and banking on South Korea's ability to defend 
itself. This was consistent with Truman's containment policy in Asia, where he hoped to 
prevent Communist expansion without relying on US military power, thereby avoiding 
the need to reverse his policy of reducing defense spending. At a press conference on 29 
June, he was still optimistic that a total commitment was avoidable, agreeing with a 
newsman's description of the war as a "police action" rather than coining the phrase 
himself. But the next morning, General Douglas MacArthur advised that without US 
combat forces, Communist conquest of South Korea was certain. Even then Truman 
hesitated. When Secretary of the Army Frank Pace told him that a decision could not 
wait, the president sent US soldiers to fight in Korea.19  
Truman made much at the time of how the United States intervened in Korea in response 
to the request for defense of the Republic of Korea from the Security Council of the 
United Nations. But the myth that the Korean War was an example of collective security 
lost its credibility long ago, given the reality that the United States acted prior to passage 
of UN resolutions. The UN Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950 provided for 
creation of a United Nations Command (UNC), requiring MacArthur, Truman's choice as 
the UNC commander, to make periodic reports on developments in the war. The Truman 
administration had blocked formation of a UN committee that would have had direct 
access to the UNC, adopting instead a procedure whereby MacArthur received 
instructions from and reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since Washington had to 
approve them, MacArthur's reports in fact were after-action summaries of information 
that was common knowledge because newspapers already had printed detailed coverage 
of the same developments. Moreover, the United States and the ROK contributed 90 
percent of the manpower. It was not the United Nations, but the United States that 
provided the weapons, equipment, and logistical support to save South Korea. All this 
provided clear proof of the nominal role that the United Nations, and collective security, 
played in the Korean War.20  
MacArthur's Inchon landing reversed the course of the Korean War, but, contrary to 
traditional beliefs, did not create the momentum that resulted in the decision to cross the 
38th parallel and continue the offensive to the Yalu. In fact, throughout July, Truman's 
advisors, certain that a battlefield victory was inevitable, debated whether to pursue 
forcible reunification once North Korea's army had been thrown out of the south. 
Initially, Acheson opposed crossing the parallel, stating publicly on 29 June that US 
military action was "solely for the purpose of restoring [South Korea] to its status prior to 
the invasion." However, State Department officials worked to change Acheson's mind, 
arguing persuasively that the United States should destroy the North Korean army and 
then sponsor free elections for a government to rule all of Korea. US military leaders 
were reluctant to endorse this drastic change in war aims until, in late July, UN defensive 
lines finally stabilized. Roughly two weeks later, Truman decided to approve military 
operations in pursuit of forcible reunification. Truman's plan for conquering North Korea, 
which he approved on 1 September, included precautions to minimize the chance of 
Chinese intervention that MacArthur later ignored. But allegations that MacArthur was 
responsible for the ill-advised advance into North Korea is a myth. Truman made this 
decision to register a victory in the Cold War.21
China's decision to intervene in the Korean War has received a thorough reexamination in 
recent years as a consequence of access to new documents and personal accounts on the 
Communist side. Chen Jian has demonstrated that Beijing's "entry into the Korean War 
was determined by concerns much more complicated than safeguarding the Chinese-
Korean border." Mao Zedong sought "to win a glorious victory" that would restore 
China's world status as the "Central Kingdom." He also wanted to repay a debt to North 
Korea, which had sent thousands of soldiers to fight in the Chinese Civil War. 
Furthermore, after the Inchon landing, Stalin had been pressing Beijing to intervene and 
prevent US conquest of North Korea. Chen insists, however, that because the triumph of 
Mao's revolutionary nationalist program was so vital to "the new China's . . . domestic 
and international interests, there was little possibility that China's entrance into the 
Korean War could have been averted."22 Building on Chen's explanation, Michael M. 
Sheng's article in this volume elaborates on why Mao dispatched Chinese forces to 
Korea. He explores the role of ideology and perception, arguing that a Chinese version of 
the "domino theory" dictated military intervention to ensure not only the survival of the 
People's Republic of China, but the Soviet Union as well. 
Recent research has contributed to a modest rehabilitation of MacArthur on other issues, 
most notably the general's persistent efforts to escalate the Korean War. After China's 
massive military assault in late November 1950, MacArthur submitted a "Plan for 
Victory" that proposed four specific steps to defeat the Communists. First, the general 
called for a blockade of China's coast. Second, he wanted authorization to bomb military 
installations in Manchuria. Third, MacArthur advocated deployment of Chinese 
Nationalist forces in Korea. Finally, he recommended that Jiang Jieshi launch an attack 
from Taiwan against the mainland.23 We now know that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, despite 
later denials, seriously considered endorsing implementation of these actions prior to 
receiving favorable reports from the battlefront late in December. By spring 1951, 
Truman had approved the first two proposals if UN forces faced annihilation or China 
expanded the war beyond Korea. In fact, the president even was prepared to use atomic 
weapons, an option that he had under consideration since the early days of the fighting. 
According to some historians, the United States was closer to using nuclear weapons in 
Korea under Truman than under his successor Dwight D. Eisenhower.24
A surprising pattern in recent writing on the Korean War has been the indifference to the 
role of MacArthur. Nevertheless, scholars have clarified events surrounding Truman's 
decision to recall the general in April 1951. Early in 1951, General Matthew B. Ridgway 
halted the Chinese Communist advance southward, making it possible for the 
administration to implement its preference for fighting a limited war in Korea. After 
Washington turned down successive pleas from MacArthur to expand the war through 
attacking China, the general grew frustrated with a policy of settling for an armistice near 
the 38th parallel. In March, his demand for an immediate Communist surrender 
sabotaged a planned ceasefire initiative. But for various reasons, many of them political, 
Truman reprimanded, but did not recall the general. By early April, a combination of 
factors forced the president to act. The JCS worried about a Chinese and Soviet military 
buildup in East Asia and thought the UN commander should have standing authority to 
retaliate against any Communist escalation, even recommending deployment of atomic 
weapons to forward Pacific bases. They mistrusted MacArthur and guessed he might 
provoke an incident in order to widen the war. While MacArthur's letter to House 
Republican Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin on 5 April once again criticizing the 
administration's efforts to limit the war was, as Truman later argued, "rank 
insubordination" and the "last straw," he already had made his decision for a more 
compelling reason related to military strategy.25
During the month after MacArthur's recall, UN forces had repulsed two massive Chinese 
Communist offensives, creating a battlefield stalemate that we now know intensified 
friction between Moscow and Beijing on how best to prosecute the war in Korea. In the 
fourth article, Zhang Xiaoming traces how limits that Stalin placed on Soviet air support 
raised China's suspicions about the reliability of its alliance relationship for Chinese 
security interests. This discord also had an impact on the armistice negotiations that 
opened at Kaesong in July, where allegedly Communist intransigence stalled progress. 
While North Korea and China did create an acrimonious atmosphere at the start with 
efforts to score propaganda points, the United States raised the first major roadblock 
when it proposed a demilitarized zone deep in North Korea.26 More important, the 
delegates made rapid progress after the talks moved to Panmunjom during October. 
Agreeing that the demilitarized zone would follow the line of battle, they promptly 
adopted inspection procedures to enforce the armistice. After approval of a postwar 
political conference to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops and reunification, a tradeoff 
settled disputes on airfield rehabilitation and membership on a neutral supervisory 
commission. Just 10 months after the talks began, negotiators would have signed an 
agreement had they not deadlocked over disposition of prisoners of war. Progress had 
occurred because both sides proposed and accepted compromises each thought would 
contribute to their preserving security interests defined in terms of military power and 
political influence.27
Popular memory still finds humanitarian motivation behind the inflexible refusal of the 
United States to return Communist prisoners of war (POWs) to China and North Korea 
against their will, coinciding with Truman's portrayal of his decision at the time. But a 
different reality has emerged regarding the issue that prevented peace in Korea for over a 
year. Truman's main goal was to win a propaganda victory in the Cold War, even though 
this necessitated a misrepresentation of the facts. For example, the US stand on the 
principle of non-forcible repatriation may have seemed moral, but it contradicted the 
Geneva Convention, which required, as the Communist side demanded, the return of all 
POWs. Far worse was the Truman administration's purposeful decision to allow the 
perception that those POWs refusing repatriation were Communists defecting to the "Free 
World." A vast majority of North Korean POWs were actually South Koreans who either 
had joined voluntarily or were impressed into the Communist army. And thousands of 
Chinese POWs were Nationalist soldiers trapped in China at the end of the civil war who 
now had the chance to escape to Taiwan. Moreover, Chinese Nationalist guards at UN 
POW camps had used terrorist "reeducation" tactics to compel prisoners to refuse 
repatriation. Those who resisted risked beatings or death. Truman's stand on voluntary 
repatriation had little to do with moral considerations.28
John Jenks' article explains how American journalists covering the truce talks were 
flexible enough to rely on Communist sources for information, but nevertheless embraced 
the same Cold War assumptions that allowed Truman to exploit the POW issue. Their 
reports probabaly contributed to mistaken beliefs about how Eisenhower achieved an 
armistice ending the Korean War. Historians acknowledge that Eisenhower entered office 
thinking about using expanded conventional bombing and the threat of nuclear attack to 
force concessions from the Communist side. The armistice agreement came on 27 July, 
after an accelerated bombing campaign in North Korea and bellicose rhetoric about 
expanding the war. Most scholars, however, reject as myth Eisenhower's claim that 
Beijing was responding to his threat of an expanded war using atomic weapons because 
no documentary evidence has surfaced to support his assertion.29 They argue that the 
Chinese, facing major internal economic problems and wanting peaceful coexistence with 
the West, already had decided to make peace once Truman left office. Stalin's death in 
March only added to China's sense of political vulnerability, causing the Communist 
delegation to break the logjam at Panmunjom later that month before Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles conveyed his atomic threat to India's prime minister for delivery to 
Beijing. Furthermore, the nuclear threats of May 1953 were not clearly or forcefully 
delivered and were not substantively different from those implied threats that the Truman 
administration made in the fall of 1951, when B-29 bombers carried out atomic bombing 
test runs over North Korea with large conventional bombs.30
By January 1953, both sides in fact wanted an armistice. Washington and Beijing had 
grown tired of the war's economic burdens, military losses, and political and military 
constraints, worrying about an expanded war, and the pressure from allies and the world 
community to end the stalemated war. Food shortages in North Korea coupled with an 
understanding that forcible reunification was no longer possible, caused Pyongyang to 
favor an armistice even earlier. Moscow's new leaders had been concerned even before 
Stalin died about economic problems in Eastern Europe. A more conciliatory approach in 
world affairs, they believed, not only would reduce the risk of war, but also might create 
tensions in the Western alliance if the United States acted provocatively in Korea. Several 
weeks before Eisenhower's threats of an expanded war using nuclear weapons and the 
bombing of North Korea's dams and irrigation system in May, Chinese negotiators 
signaled a change in policy when they accepted the UNC's proposal for an exchange of 
sick and wounded POWs and then recommended turning non-repatriates over to a neutral 
state. Also, in late May and early June 1953, Chinese forces launched powerful attacks 
against positions that South Korean units were defending along the front line. Far from 
being intimidated, Beijing thus showed its continuing resolve, relying on military means 
to persuade the United States to compromise on the final terms of the armistice. In the 
end, both sides conceded points on the POW repatriation issue.31
Scholars undoubtedly will continue to debate how the Korean War ended, but few writers 
now disagree that the conflict was the key turning point in postwar international history. 
It militarized the Cold War and projected the Soviet-American confrontation not only 
into Asia, but the rest of the Third World. In her article in this volume, Catherine 
Forslund uses cartoons of the era to demonstrate the powerful impact that Korea had on 
popular attitudes toward the Cold War in the United States. Unfortunately, the same 
myths that would dominate American thinking after June 1950 seemed to dictate the 
initial foreign policy of President George W. Bush after he assumed office in January 
2001. At a 7 March press conference with visiting South Korean President Kim Dae-
jung, he said that there were no plans at that time to resume talks with Pyongyang to end 
its ballistic missile program and missile exports because of questions about its 
trustworthiness and verifiability of existing agreements. His approach placed at risk the 
significant progress that President Kim has made over the prior three years toward 
reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula through opening an isolated regime to contacts 
with the outside world. This "Sunshine Policy" of engagement and cooperation with 
North Korea, for which Kim won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000, received strong support 
from the Clinton administration because it was able to act not on the old myths about 
Korea, but its new realities.  
Exposing the myths surrounding the Korean War is important not just to serve the 
interests of historical accuracy. The realities of that conflict are instructive because they 
teach lessons about the impact of US participation in world affairs during and after World 
War II. Connections between Korea and Vietnam are obvious, although historians have 
not sufficiently probed the links between these two Asian wars. But another lesson of the 
Korean War that will have continuing significance is how Americans relate to people of 
other nationalities and cultures. Recent US expressions of regret for the No Gun Ri 
incident, in which US soldiers killed innocent South Korean civilians during the first 
month of fighting in Korea, provides an excellent example illustrating this point. 
Maintaining the myth that US intervention in the Korean War was an act of idealism and 
altruism reinforces the wrong lessons about the conflict's meaning, serving to fuel the 
anti-Americanism in South Korea that has been a destructive force in US-Korean 
relations for at least the past four decades. The articles in this volume are representative 
of the recent research and writing about the Korean War presenting a more accurate 
account of the conflict that has made an important contribution to strengthening relations 
between South Korea and the United States. While the resolution of some issues awaits 
the release of more archival material, historians have exposed enough myths about Korea 
that no longer does it warrant description as the forgotten war. 
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